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Introduction 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 was a pioneering step taken by the United 
States government to confront the growing realization of the amount of improper payments 
occurring abroad. It’s not that American companies were the sole culprits of these practices, 
but it was the first country to try and shape its international interest.  
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was passed as a direct progeny of the 
Watergate Scandal in the 1970s1. It was at that time that US government officials found 
evidence supporting claims that many US companies took part in illegal payments to foreign 
government officials. Public outrage prompted Congress to pass legislation to combat such 
activity. The FCPA also requires stricter guidelines in maintaining internal control systems that 
would actively discover bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal payments. The new provisions were 
enacted to increase the accuracy and dependability of reported financial statements that 
conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  
 As with all legislation, there are two opposing parties on the bearing that the FCPA has 
had on American businesses’ performance abroad. The consenting view argues that illicit 
payments are morally and ethically wrong. The immense amount of bribes and kick-backs that 
were taken place abroad were negatively affecting the United States image as a moral, world 
                                                          
1 Weismann, Miriam F. "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Failure of the Self-Regulatory Model of 
Corporate Governance in the Global Business Environment." Journal of Business Ethics 88.4 (2009): 615-
661. 
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leader. That the anti-bribery and internal accounting provisions are necessary moves to 
regulate this behavior as well as balance out the market so that every company has a equal and 
fair opportunity to compete. 
 The dissenting view scrutinizes the FCPA for being a hindrance to American businesses 
performance abroad. They present several arguments in opposition to the current legislation. 
The first being the FCPA does not apply to foreign competitors who conduct business free of 
moral scruples giving them the competitive advantage in many markets. Those so called 
“grease payments” are a necessity in the ordinary course of business to expedite transactions. 
One of the largest deterrents for this side is that many companies are unsure of the amount of 
disclosure needed to meet the accounting provisions. These companies either over spend trying 
to meet these requirements or aren’t disclosing properly. 
 This structure of this paper seeks to present the moral and ethical frameworks in which 
to consider the effect of bribing on business and the great community; confront the cultural 
differences that lie between American businesses and its potential interest abroad, as well as 
the growing international move to implementation similar to that of the FCPA; analyze prior 
anti-bribery legislation and the historical events that prompted the need for a policy like the 
FCPA, discuss the basic elements of the policy’s two pronged approach of anti-bribery and 
disclosure regulation; examine several cases in the enforcement of the FCPA on American 
businesses; and consider the advantages and disadvantages of the statute on the performance 
of American businesses as a factor of total international exports. 
Introduction 
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  I investigated the enforcement of the FCPA from the perspective of American businesses 
by exploring the effect of the 1977 legislation on US corporation performance in the 
International markets. I believe that the FCPA has had a negative impact on the performance, 
and, therefore, profitability of American firms.  
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Ethics in Bribing and Management 
Bribery is broadly defined as a technique used by an agent to purchase influence or 
loyalty of another. From a legal standpoint, a bribe can be defined as: 
The crime of giving or taking money or some other valuable item in order to 
influence a public official (any governmental employee) in the performance of 
his/her duties. Bribery includes paying to get government contracts (cutting in 
the roads commissioner for a secret percentage of the profit), giving a bottle of 
liquor to a building inspector to ignore a violation or grant a permit, or selling 
stock to a Congressman at a cut-rate price.2 
 But primie facie what is a bribe? The most common form of bribery is Commercial Bribery 
where an outsider purchases an agent in order to induce more favorable treatment.3 Bribes are 
most often witnessed when an entity wishes to increase their sales, or enter a new market, or 
positively or negatively influence the direction of public policy.4 These types of economic 
transactions can prove difficult to detect; so if a favorable response is expected after the gift is 
offered, it is most likely a bribe. 
There are three substantially different types of bribes that are known to have varying 
effects on the legal and social systems they occur in: Transaction Bribes, Variance Bribes, and 
Outright Purchase. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s anti-bribery provision bars specific US 
                                                          
2 Black’s Law Dictionary. "Commercial Bribery." Black's Law Dictionary. Web. 23 Jan. 2011. 
<http://www.blackslawdictionary.com/>. 
3 Fritzsche, David J. Business Ethics: A Global & Managerial Perspective. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2005, 10. 
4 Ibid., 11. 
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companies (those who have filed with Securities and Exchange Commission)  and their affiliates  
from being directly or indirectly involved in making illicit payments to foreign officials and 
associated agents for the purpose of influencing a business decision.5 
A Transaction Bribe is the most common of the three because it seen as more as a 
facilitating payment rather than an immoral corrupt transaction. Riesman defines a Transaction 
Bribe as “a type of payment, usually impersonally made, to a public official to secure or 
accelerate performance of his prescribed function.6 This type of bribe is not utilized to procure 
any business favoritism. Its sole purpose has to do with an already assured performance. In this 
instance, we should view time as an important economic commodity and a Transaction Bribe as 
a tool employed to maximize the value of that economic transaction and minimize the 
gratuitous phase in the economic event.7 For example, many restaurant patrons might tip the 
Maitre de in order to expedite their seating process or to ensure they are not seated at a table 
too close to the kitchen. 
The use of a Transaction Bribe would be categorized as a public tool. Typically, the type 
of environment dictates whether the disbursement is an acceptable device and once it is 
established society it becomes common knowledge.8 To continue with our example, any person 
who walks into the restaurant has the option (not the capacity in situations where a low-
income person visits the establishment) to approach the Maitre de and solicit assistance. The 
                                                          
5 Mooney, Elizabeth V. "Bribery Norm In Foreign Markets Poses Legal Challenge For U.S. Firms." 
LexisNexis Academic. LexisNexis, 30 Mar. 1998. Web. 5 Feb. 2011. 
6 Reisman, W. Michael. Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms. New York: Free, 1979, 69. 
7 Ibid., 70. 
8 Ibid., 74. 
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payment functions as a general service that is not implicitly secret but explicitly discreet. There 
is customarily a going rate, a payment whose value will secure the necessary action to expedite 
a specific action.9  If that payment amount is uncharacteristically larger than the typical 
Transaction Bribe then it would reclassify the payment.10  
Transaction Bribes are viewed in a negative light in Western cultures because even if a 
small number of administrators partake in the transaction then it cast doubt upon the whole. 
The system will suffer humiliation and the public will lose faith in the government. However, in 
monarchial societies, kings often used titles and land rights to encourage nobles to assent to 
their authority and conduct their orders. The practice became acceptable within a monarchy 
but would be detrimental to a democratic government.11  
The second type of bribe, a Variance Bribe, is more deleterious to society.  In most cases 
this form of a bribe is applied to “secure the suspension or non-application of a norm to a case 
where the application would otherwise be appropriate.”12 The appellation given to this type of 
bribe is appropriate because it requires a variation from the law or principle regulations. A 
person makes a variance bribe when a person wants the system to operate in their favor. For 
example: 
• Payment to a building inspector to intentionally overlook building code 
violations; 
• Payment to a recruiter remove your name from a draft lottery; 
• Payments to an Internal Revenue Service agent discharge you from you tax 
obligations. 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 71. 
10 Ibid., 72. 
11 Ibid., 74. 
12 Ibid., 75. 
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A Transaction Bribe has always proven difficult to track because the bribe does not require the 
agent in the organization to deviate from their proscribed duties or visibly interfere with their 
fiduciary duty, while a Variance Bribe is unequivocally apparent.13 Variance Bribes offer the 
payer private favor and in turn hurt the community because of the departure from the principle 
of fair competition.14 In the long run, these types of bribes alter the normal course of the 
system. 
 Many developing countries experience Variance bribes that centralize power to an 
individual or group of elites. In democratic countries politicians try to gain control of non-civil 
service appointments. The ability to grant government contracts awards these public officials 
with a lot of power and grants them agency to realize countless lucrative schemes. 15 
The final type of bribe is the most detrimental to the community because it completely 
shifts the agent’s loyalty from the organization to another party.  The Outright Purchase 
payment is not as much of a bribe as it is a payment to attain a new employee.16 The agent will 
maintain the façade of loyalty, yet in reality he shifts his loyalty and completely disregards his 
fiduciary duty. An Outright Purchase allows you to buy and pocket an official. This technique is 
commonly used in espionage when governments buy foreign agents.17   The Outright Purchase 
is a conflict of interest and corrupts the motive of that agent’s actions. It requires an extreme 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 74.  
14 Ibid., 78. 
15 Ibid., 88. 
16 Ibid., 89. 
17 Ibid., 90. 
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degree of secrecy because of the implication to both parties involved in the transaction. 
Determining whether any of these modes of payments are fair can be determined by exploring 
them through moral frameworks. Utilitarianism, morality, and social justice will provide the 
deciding framework as to the efficacy of legal administration effects of bribes on the behavior 
of American businesses.  
There are several interpretations of the utilitarianism principle but the general 
interpretation of the ideal is that any decision can be ethical if the greatest good is reached for 
the greatest number of people. The action must provide the community with the greatest net 
benefit compared to other possible decisions.18 The simplest way to approach utilitarianism is 
to think of it as a basic equation. One side of the equation consists of an assortment of variables 
that represent the actions taken by individuals. The equality sign of the equation is not an equal 
sign (=) but a greater than or equal sign (). The final component of the utilitarian equation is 
simply “good.” This inequality allows stakeholders to view actions as a group or singular and 
consider specific interest to devise alternatives that will equal the greatest good for all.19  
Utilitarianism is the most intuitive thought process for business entities because it is 
essentially a Cost-Benefit analysis method.20 Companies approach each decision by defining and 
weighing the social, economic, moral, and monetary cost and benefits that accompany each 
                                                          
18 Fritzsche, David J. Business Ethics: A Global & Managerial Perspective. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2005, 48. 
19 Weiss, Joseph W. Business Ethics: A Stake and Issues Management Approach. 4th ed. Mason, OH: 
Thomson South-Western, 2006, 120. 
20 Adler, Matthew D., and Eric A. Posner. New Foundations of Cost-benefit Analysis. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard UP, 2006, 22.  
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business decision.21 In determining whether this moral framework is helpful in determining the 
morality of Transaction Bribes, Variance Bribes, and Outright Purchases, the assessor would 
have to determine societal benefits, the business increase, and the negative notoriety and 
financial fines that could ensue if a company takes action.22 Because of the quantity and 
intricacy of each factor, the utilitarianism framework is believed to be exclusive to particular 
situations. 
The next framework is a person’s moral rights. A person has legal and moral rights that 
are derived from different distinct authorities. Legal rights are privilege afforded to citizens by 
the government of a specific country. The United State Declaration of Independence confers 
the right “to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”23 On the other hand, moral rights are 
universal rights that all human beings have the faculty to enjoy.24 You have the responsibility to 
not violate another’s moral rights and they in turn have that same duty in protecting your moral 
rights. Within the scope of our bribes, the analysis of the transaction must not impede on 
another’s rights. Because the elementary concepts of the bribes differ we must examine each 
separately.  
Transaction bribes are generally used in services that are available to any and every 
citizen. It does not function to tip the scales in anyone’s particular favor and does not obscure 
the market’s ability to operate fairly. In the scope of moral rights, a Transaction Bribe would be 
                                                          
21 Weiss, Joseph W. Business Ethics: A Stake and Issues Management Approach. 4th ed. Mason, OH: 
Thomson South-Western, 2006, 124 
22 Shaw, Bill. "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Legal and Moral Analysis." Journal of Business Ethics 7 
(1988): 789-95, 791. 
23 111th Cong., U.S. G.P.O. (2009) (enacted). Print. 
24 Weiss, Joseph W. Business Ethics: A Stake and Issues Management Approach. 4th ed. Mason, OH: 
Thomson South-Western, 2006, 126. 
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considered ethical in the normal course of business. Variance Bribes and Outright Purchases 
would be considered immoral because it violates a competitor’s ability to contend on an equal 
playing field. One party would have an inside agent constantly acting in his/her favor and 
destabilize the concepts of fair competition.25 
Social Justice is the last framework to examine in conjunction with the three types of 
bribes. Social Justice is generally associated with the fair distribution of benefits (education, job, 
wealth leisure) and burdens (taxes, work, social and civic responsibilities).26 Every person in a 
society has the right to take advantage of these basic liberties. Since we do not live in a perfect 
environment where these opportunities can be equally distributed, we refine the definition so 
that all people of all economic backgrounds have the best possible access the broadest 
liberties.27 The Social Justice framework proves that all three types of bribes will fail to meet 
ethical standards. 
Companies might all have the opportunity to expedite service through Transaction 
Bribes but under the Social Justice framework if all but one company chooses against 
participating in this behavior that would skew the normal distribution required for the bribe to 
be just. A Variance Bribe buys favoritism. Any type of preferential treatment immediately 
makes the Variance Bribe unethical.  Finally, the Outright Purchase mitigates an organization’s 
                                                          
25 Shaw, Bill. "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Legal and Moral Analysis." Journal of Business Ethics 7 
(1988): 789-95, 791. 
26 Miller, David. Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999, 10/ 
27 Fritzsche, David J. Business Ethics: A Global & Managerial Perspective. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2005, 52.  
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impartiality because one player in the market would have an inside agent acting on their behalf 
ultimately making the last type of bribe immoral additionally.28 
Understanding the different types of bribes and the potential immorality in the 
transactions is of no substance if the officers in charge disregard the ethical dilemmas for 
private or corporate gain. An important question that must be asked is where do managers owe 
their loyalty— to shareholders or stakeholders? On one hand, you have your everyday citizen 
who invests in a firm to own a piece of the corporation, while on the other you have actual 
stakeholders in the company, including executives, employees, creditors, and suppliers. 
Corporate Governance is a term that encompasses the processes, rules, and laws by 
which a business is regulated, operated, and controlled. The term broadly refers to internal 
drivers of a corporation such as officers and stockholders as well as external vehicles such as 
clients, government regulations, and consumer groups.29 Corporate Accountability deals with 
the relationship between a corporation and the society that has authorized the corporation to 
function. In turn for being allowed to operate, the corporation owes society duties outside the 
customary legal regulation must also maintain a high ethical standard.30 It is the duty of 
managers to preserve these standards as well as maximize the value of the firm. Because the 
expanded definition of Corporate Governance and Accountability has moved to embrace the 
                                                          
28 Shaw, Bill. "Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Legal and Moral Analysis." Journal of Business Ethics 7 
(1988): 789-95, 791. 
29 Malik, Fredmund. Managing, Performing, Living: Effective Management for a New Era. Frankfurt, M.: 
Campus-Verl., 2006. Print, 135 
30 Bostrom, Robert E. "Corporate Governance: Developments And Best Practices One Year After 
Sarbanes-Oxley." LexisNexis Academic. LexisNexis, Oct. 2003. Web. 05 Feb. 2011. 
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community as another patron, managers’ scope of concerns has expanded to maximize value 
for not just its immediate interest. 
Social Responsibility is closely related to notion of Corporate Accountability in that both 
concepts view the corporation on a larger scale not just as an economic entity but also as a 
social institution in the community. Corporations are facing increased pressures as players in 
society because they occupy major economic roles that are elaborately intertwined in every 
facet of our daily lives.31 The recent federal bailout proves that society cannot allow these 
companies to fail because of the immediate consequences that would ripple through our lives. 
The government has a responsibility to maintain a corporate environment that not only is 
economically successful but also morally sincere. In recent years, the government and 
corporations have formed a new relationship built to foster a sound economic environment. 
Recently, commercial regulation has made progressive moves toward having a larger social 
effect.32 Stakeholders continue to focus on obtaining more influence over executive decisions 
through legal channels while managing public/media relations. The new corporate-business 
relationship is rooted in the public sector. Because the two are linked, legislation like the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act functions to increase public attitude towards the system. 
 
                                                          
31 De Kluyver, Cornelis A.  A Primer on Corporate Governance. New York, NY: Business Expert, 2009.  
32 Ibid.  
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Cultural Aspects of Facilitating Payments 
 
The Sherman Act (U.S. antitrust law) regulates the formation of monopolies and cartels. 
It gives the federal government the responsibility and power to legally pursue any group, 
company, or organization who might be engaged in monopolistic behavior.33 The Sherman Act 
defined a trust as a corporation that had the ability to achieve undue profits by way of price 
fixing, quantity, and quality manipulation of goods and services.34 The original act was passed in 
the late nineteenth century in response to the negatively affected American business that 
weren’t given the chance to compete because of the trusts’ large market control35 The 
dominant economic theory for most of the nineteenth century encouraged the formation of 
trust until public outcry prompted government response by Ohio Senator John Sherman, the 
legislation’s chief proponent. The Sherman Act saw little action until the twentieth century and 
the formation of the Federal Trade Commission through the FTC Act of 1914.36  
The antitrust law and the FCPA were moves by the United States government to 
attempt to corral unfair business practices, and with that, corruption. General public opinion 
says that corruption has a negative effect on economic performance.  Our moral and ethical 
frameworks stand as a concurrent position against the practice of bribes.  Yet there is 
significant evidence that bribery has a monopolizing effect for incumbent firms.  A corrupt 
                                                          
33 "Sherman Antitrust Act." Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2011. Web. 20 March. 2011. 
34 "Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act." Welcome to 
the United States Department of Justice. 1 Sept. 2008. Web. 25 Mar. 2011. 
35 "Sherman Antitrust Act." Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2011. Web. 20 March. 2011. 
36 Ibid. 
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government official will be hesitant to allow new firms to function within their region when 
they are regularly receiving payments from incumbent firms. 37 New firms do present more 
competition to the market and potentially higher profits through illegal payments for the 
bureaucrat but there’s no guarantee that the new firm will be willing to participate in the 
“grease wheel” approach. Corruption can decrease the degree of potential competition that 
would optimize a market.38 Bribery undermines accountability, law, and market-based decision 
making.39 
A study in Brazil shows that corruption prevents new firms from having the ability to 
enter the market and serves to increase the market share of incumbent firms. Of the 
electronics and textile CEOs that were surveyed, seventy-percent of them labeled corruption as 
the leading barrier to entry. The study showed that the certainty of a company’s willingness to 
bribe had a positive effect on the firm’s performance. While the actual size of the bribe didn’t 
correlate to firm performance, corruption imposes a considerable learning curve and cost to 
possible new competitors in a market. These new firms are uncertain of the frequency of the 
required bribe, the amount to be paid, or when a particular bribe can be avoided.40 
A study conducted in Russia revealed that many Russians believe that bribery is an 
acceptable practice and don’t view it as morally wrong. The common consensus is that if no 
money changes hands then it doesn’t constitute a bribe. Exchanging gifts, services, or favors for 
                                                          
37  Campos, Nauro F. "Guest Post: Corruption as a Barrier to Entry « Naked Capitalism." Naked 
Capitalism. 5 Nov. 2010. Web. 5 Mar. 2011.   
38 Ibid. 
39 U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Addressing the Challenges of 
International Bribery and Fair Competition 2004. Washington, 2004. Print, 1. 
40 Campos, Nauro F. "Guest Post: Corruption as a Barrier to Entry « Naked Capitalism." Naked Capitalism. 
5 Nov. 2010. Web. 5 Mar. 2011.   
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a specific action is just ones’ neighborly duty. 21% of people across Russia admitted to paying a 
bribe in the past year, while that figure was 40% in Russia’s capitol, Moscow. In the health 
services industry, 44% of people said that it was customary to additionally compensate doctors 
and nurses for better health services. One disturbing figure was that a third of Russians said it 
was morally acceptable to bribe a higher education official in order to place their child in 
college or university. The government employees that were surveyed as well were just as likely 
to view bribes as moral. It would cost an entrepreneur $135,000 to set-up a new business. This 
type of payment has long been viewed as a “victimless crime” in Russia. Recent democratic 
reforms have stated that bribes undercut the quality of life, especially for those who don’t have 
the means to participate in the culture, but few people agree with this sentiment. The most 
alarming conclusion from the study was the fact younger Russians, aged 15 to 24, are more 
likely to approve of bribing than older Russians who remember the Soviet Union.41 
In countries like Russia that are bribery prone, some cases show that American 
executives are the targets of extortion schemes and are not willing participants in the illegal 
business method.42 Foreign officials hold a lot of power: sway over the timing of a shipment 
promptness of which necessary paperwork needs to be filed, and even the selection in 
government contracts. If a firm is first approached by a foreign bureaucrat and informed that 
                                                          
41 Gradirovski, Sergei, and Neli Esipova. "Corruption in Russia: Is Bribery Always Wrong?" Gallup.Com - 
Daily News, Polls, Public Opinion on Government, Politics, Economics, Management. 15 Nov. 2006. Web. 
23 Feb. 2011. 
42  Boylan, Michael. Business Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001. Print. 
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“it would be in their interest” to deposit a payment to guarantee business that would leave few 
options available to American firms.43  
American firms were at a constant disadvantage throughout the nineties. During the 
first decade after the inception of the FCPA, The SEC and DOJ investigated only twenty 
instances of possible violations. The nineties increased scrutiny from both regulation agents, 
and increased anxiety in American companies because of possible violations by foreign 
subsidiaries.  Strang Hayes Consulting Inc., an investigative management firm, concluded that 
the US persistently has trouble competing with foreign competitors. Many similar professionals 
view the original legislation as “naïve” because it failed to account for the widespread adoption 
of bribery as a necessary business practice. The OECD anti-bribery convention led the initiative 
to deem bribery as bad for business. The reality is that many foreign countries are looking for a 
competitive advantage to gain market share. The 1988 amendment currently allows grease 
payments, or transaction bribes, but other types of bribes (variance bribes and outright 
purchases) are utterly unlawful. The last factor in curtailing the corruption is the existence of an 
organization whose sole duty is maintain business integrity. It’s 2011 and the world still lacks 
one international regulation agency to police bribery activity. Neither the United Nations nor 
World Court has accepted the responsibility of assuming this role.44  
The US Department of Commerce has continuously sought strategies to encourage US 
and international commerce. Since the passing of the FCPA, The US government has received 
                                                          
43 Campos, Nauro F. "Guest Post: Corruption as a Barrier to Entry « Naked Capitalism." Naked Capitalism. 
5 Nov. 2010. Web. 5 Mar. 2011. 
44  Mooney, Elizabeth V. "Bribery Norm in Foreign Markets Poses Legal Challenge for U.S. Firms." Radio 
Communication Report (1998): 26-28. Lexis Nexus. Web. 5 Feb. 2011. 
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information pertaining to the disadvantages American companies face abroad because of the 
lack of legislation in competing company countries. The DOC has directly attacked international 
corruption by engaging in trade agreements with its international trading partners and 
monitoring their efficiency.45 “Bribery to corrupt those charged with the public trust but who 
lack a moral compass deprives countries of the resources needed to promote growth and 
development.46 Real progress was made with the aid of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation (OECD) and the passing of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions by the thirty-eight OECD member countries.47 
The OECD is always actively seeking out more nations to ratify the Convention. In 2001 and 
2002, Slovenia and Ireland ratified the Convention, respectively.48  
Originally founded in 1961, the OECD’s main focus is a democratic forum that provides 
an arena for policy discussion, seek answers to problems, as well as coordinate international 
strategies to cross-border issues ranging from money-laundering, tax evasion, and corruption 
The OECD is headquartered in Paris and is currently composed of an array of member countries 
located on every continent. The OECD maintains working relationships with over seventy 
countries that follow many of the pronouncements published by the organization.49 
                                                          
45 Darrough, Masako N. The FCPA and the OECD Convention Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience. 
New York: CUNY, 2004. Print, 255.  
46 U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Addressing the Challenges of 
International Bribery and Fair Competition 2004. Washington, 2004. Print, 1. 
47 Darrough, Masako N. The FCPA and the OECD Convention Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience. 
New York: CUNY, 2004. Print, 255.  
48 U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Addressing the Challenges of 
International Bribery and Fair Competition 2004. Washington, 2004. Print, 7. 
49 BBC. "BBC NEWS | Business | OECD: What Is It and What Does It Do?" BBC News - Home. 12 Feb. 
2003. Web. 23 Feb. 2011. 
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After many years of US petitioning, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was signed on 
December 17, 1997 and came into force on February 15, 1999.50 The OECD is not an 
international oversight agency and has no actual authority to implement or enforce legislation 
so it relies on its member countries to sanction anti-bribery regulation. “The signatory nations 
effectively form a cartel to reduce the cost of doing business.”51 Many American companies 
argued that the FCPA placed them at a competitive disadvantage against its foreign 
competitors.52 US companies lost $45 billion in 1994 to foreign competitors who illicitly 
solicited bribes. With the ratification of the OECD Convention US firms had a fighting chance in 
the international market.53 In a study conducted by Masako N. Darrough, US companies 
showed a decline in bribery prone countries and were discouraged from even competing. These 
firms consciously decided to reduce activity in these countries.54  
The OECD Convention is viewed as a “supply side” agreement because it seeks to halt 
those who offer, promise or pay a bribe.55 Because of the US involvement in spearheading this 
initiative the Convention is very similar to the FCPA.  A foreign public official is defined as any 
individual who exercise his duties as a public function. This includes officers of international 
organizations as well as consultants and other third party agents. It requires its member 
countries to install “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive criminal penalties” to any person 
who violates the legislation. Penalties are to include confiscation or seizure of monetary or 
                                                          
50 Darrough, Masako N. The FCPA and the OECD Convention Some Lessons from the U.S. Experience. New 
York: CUNY, 2004. Print, 255. 
51  Ibid., 270. 
52 Ibid., 258. 
53 Ibid., 259. 
54 Ibid., 261. 
55  Ibid., 4. 
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property of similar value. Each country must establish criminal liabilities for entities that violate 
the legislation as well as make bribery of foreign officials signify a prior offense for money 
laundering. The same conditions will apply to bribing a domestic official. The legislation must 
implement standards to regulate internal controls and prevent off-book accounts. Lastly, any 
violation in any member country would be considered an extraditable offense.56  
Prior to the OECD Convention, almost half of the member countries recognized bribes as 
a legitimate business expenses and included in its tax code exemptions for bribes.57  
Despite the constructive moves already in place, the US remains worried about the tax 
deductions of bribes in many foreign countries. The legal framework in many countries does 
not cover companies below a certain size or bribes of a certain type. The relevant laws may not 
be specific enough to disallow tax deductibility. The legislation many not extend to a countries 
territories or dependents. As well as overly broad tax deductibility categories may provide 
companies with wiggle room to disguise bribes as legitimate expenses.58 The US has suggested 
that the OECD expressly disavow the deductibility of bribes in member countries’ legislation 
and increase tax authorities and public official’s awareness and education of the guidelines that 
help them detect bribes of foreign officials.59  
There are other issues the Department of Commerce believes that the OECD needs to 
address to solidify its position on corruption. They include acts of bribery including foreign 
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political parties and foreign political candidates (which is covered in the FCPA). Make bribery of 
public officials a predicate offense to money-laundering. The Convention would benefit also if 
the OECD clearly defined the role of foreign subsidiaries in bribery transactions as well the role 
of off-shore centers in bribery transactions.60 
The FCPA as well as the OECD Convention covers international organizations. The 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair competition Act of 1998 covers more than 80 international 
organizations including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and World Trade 
Organization.61 Currently these organizations all participate in transparency programs that 
encourage ethical behavior.62 The continued transparency in these organizations can only serve 
to benefit the international business community.  
From May 1, 2003 to April 30, 2004, information shows that the awarding of forty-seven 
contracts worth $18 billion may have been affected by bribes. The year before forty contracts 
valued at $23 billion were believed to have been affected by illegal transactions. The OECD 
estimated that bribes won ninety percent of these contracts. The OECD has concluded that the 
US lost eight of these contracts valued at $8 billion dollars. Just two years ago the number of 
contracts thought to be procured by bribing was over sixty. Prosecution against the firms 
discovered to have participated in this behavior is meant to send a message to the world and 
help curtail bribing action.63 
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The OECD is also facing a major push by the US to implement section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This particular section on internal controls requires each annual 
report to contain a statement of management’s responsibilities for establishing and maintain 
internal controls by requiring the CEO and CFO to sign off on financial statements. This would 
also require the independent auditor to attest the entities effectiveness of internal controls.64  
Control and oversight is an important factor in the success of the OECD Convention. 
That is why the OECD formed the Working Group on Bribery, which consists of different 
representatives of every party of the convention. The group’s main focus is the development 
and research on the implementation of anti-bribery legislation in member countries and the 
monitoring of that legislation. The OECD developed an initial two phase approach to tackle this 
issue.65  
Phase One monitoring reviews are intended to verify that all parties to the Convention 
have working domestic laws in place that prohibit bribing foreign officials.66 This initial step 
allows not only for the OECD to evaluate the country but also a self-assessment provided 
through a questionnaire. The OECD committee is comprised of two lead countries that chose 
the experts who are in responsible for the evaluation. The self-evaluation requires specific and 
ample information about the country’s legal system and other applicable laws so that the 
examiners may perform an adequate assessment. It’s mandatory for the replies to the 
                                                          
64 Ibid., 51. 
65 Nickerson, Kathryn. "International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention." Federal Ethics 
Report 12.3 (2003): 1-10. Print, 3. 
66 Ibid., 3. 
Cultural Aspects of Facilitating Payments 
26 
 
questionnaire to be reported in English or French, the two official OECD languages67.  A report 
is then drafter with the examiner’s conclusion, suggested amendments to current legislation, 
and overall performance.68 The Working Group completed all of the Phase One reviews in 2004 
with the exception of Slovenia which was completed in 2005.69  
Throughout the Phase One reviews several key shortcomings were identified.  Many 
countries were lacking the basic elements of the Convention. Their legislation didn’t explicitly 
cover giving, promising, or offering a bribe. Several countries omitted the third party clause or 
even didn’t include the definition of a “foreign public official.”70 Appropriate liability wasn’t 
placed on corporations or senior individuals to properly prosecute violators.  Financial and 
incarceration punishment weren’t adequate enough to deter violation. The maximum statutes 
of limitations were too brief. Many countries were found to have laws that lacked appropriate 
or adequate extradition clauses or mutual legal assistance.71  
Phase Two’s primary goal was to gauge the structure of a country’s laws in place to 
enforce the OECD convention and assess their utilization in its practice. The US views Phase 
Two as a long time commitment, as enforcement laws should ever be evolving.72 Phase Two is 
similar to Phase One in that two countries are chosen to lead the review and it requires the 
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member country to complete a questionnaire. The questionnaire is a scenario provided by the 
examiners and the member country must complete it in accordance with their current 
enforcement laws. The review committee then analyzes it and forms their conclusion on that 
basis.73 The working group aims to complete a process that is “flexible, transparent, rigorous, 
and credible.74  
Issues arose in various phase 2 reports varying from anti-bribery awareness and training, 
to technical cooperation, to accounting provision, to sanctions and jurisdiction. Public officials 
in many member countries were unaware of the new legislation and countries were putting in 
place programs to increase awareness to help combat bribery. Some countries don’t have in 
place guidelines for international cooperation in order to take advantage of the Convention.  
Accounting issues are a primary signaler to corruption and some countries weren’t adequately 
enforcing the accounting provision standards. Many countries aren’t imposing large enough 
fines in order to prevent future similar behavior in companies. Companies must see that bribery 
is bad for business. 
A third phase was implemented in December 2009 to function as a permanent check for 
individual member countries. Phase Three can be considered a shorter more focused version of 
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Phase Two.  Its purpose is to maintain anti-bribery legislation that will constantly be revised as 
the OECD implements greater and more efficient rules.75  
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions isn’t the only international treaty that exists. The United Nations 
Convention against Corruption was entered into force on December 15, 2005. The regulation is 
very similar to the FCPA as well as the OECD Convention but includes a new asset recovery 
clause that allows countries to recover monies or properties lost by corrupt officials. Many 
officials that succumb to bribery live in some of the poorest countries. This law allows them to 
recover millions of dollars and or resources that could be lost in these corrupt transactions.76  
The Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC) predated the OECD 
Convention and was the first international legislation that tackled the corruption dilemma 
facing the world. It was adopted by the OAS (Organization American States) on March 29, 1996 
and came into force on March 6, 1997. The OAS is comprised of the thirty-five states that 
compromise North America, Central America, and South America except for Honduras (which 
was suspended for political reason). IACAC has two primary goals. The first is to promote and 
strengthen the elements member states used to prevent, detect, and reprimand and eradicate 
corruption. “To promote and strengthen the development by each of the States Parties of the 
mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption; and to promote, 
facilitate and regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the effectiveness of 
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measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the performance 
of public functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such performance.”77  
The combined efforts of the world’s leading powers are meaningful to halting dishonest 
business practices and promoting a stronger world economy and international relationships. 
Companies will understand that commerce that follows the letter of the law not only best 
serves them but also the countries they conduct business with. 
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Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
 
Governments have been creating laws to disallow officials from accepting bribes 
throughout history. The FCPA was not the first attempt by congress to curtail corporate bribery. 
The Interstate Commerce Act was passed in 1887 to forbid any bribe to a railroad employee to 
influence a business decision.78 The Twentieth century saw similar laws passed in the shipping, 
meat and grain industries. The Internal Revenue Code Section 162 was amended to bar illegal 
payments from being tax deductable.79 Like the Interstate Commerce Act, most of the 
regulation was only specific to domestic business transactions. Operations abroad usually just 
required a disclosure of business activities. It was the public outcry after the numerous scandals 
of the early seventies that prompted new, more cumbersome action. 
 Amid the malignant stalemate of the Vietnam War, Americans were frustrated with 
continuing actions of the government. Public opinion craved for an end that was nowhere in 
sight. Then in 1972, it was discovered that President Nixon’s reelection campaign had received 
$60 million in donations from various corporations.80 The Tillman Act of 1907 was the current 
legislation regulating campaign donations prohibited corporate donations to political 
campaigns.81 Some of the largest companies in the nation at the time had illegally funneled 
thousands of dollars to Nixon’s campaign. Some of the companies include: “American airlines, 
$55,000; Brainaff Airways, $40,000; Ashland Oil, $100,000; Goodyear Tire and Rubber, $40,000; 
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Gulf Oil, $100,000; Northrop, $150,000; and Phillips Petroleum $100,000.”82 The findings of the 
investigation opened the floodgates for an SEC investigation into the appropriation of illegal 
corporate expenditures. 
 One of these investigations was prompted by the suicide of Eli M. Black, chairman and 
President of the United Brand Company, on February 3, 1975. Black was initially heralded as a 
financial wizard as he was able to acquire several companies to diversify United’s holdings. 
United ran into some difficulty in April of 1974 when numerous Central American governments 
began increasing taxation on banana exports. Later that year, hurricane Fifi ravished Central 
American crops destroying over seventy percent of the regions banana crops. United reported a 
sixty million dollar operating loss for the year and was forced to begin measures to offset its 
losses. The SEC’s investigation into Black’s death discovered a $1.25 million payment to 
Honduran President Oswaldo Lopez Arellano and another promised installment of $1.25 million 
to significantly decrease the banana tax.  A $750,000 payment to Italian official to reduce 
importing restrictions also was discovered. Even though at the time the payments were made 
they weren’t considered illegal, but concealing the payments off-book was a major SEC 
violation. This series of events was then dubbed “The Bananagate Scandal.”83  
 The public reached their limit and their outcry finally resulted in government 
intervention. The basic proscription of the FCPA: Any citizen, national, or resident of the US, 
and corporation (foreign or domestic) that has filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and any business unit whose primary arena of commerce is centralized in the US is 
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subject to the rules of the FCPA. Each of the previously stated parties is barred from “knowingly 
making use of instruments or interstate commerce to corruptly to pay, offer to pay, promise to 
pay, or to authorize the payment of any money, gift, or promise to give, anything of value to 
any foreign official for purposes of influencing any act… in order to assist such issuer in 
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.84 A similar 
prohibition applies with respect to payments to a foreign political party or official thereof or 
candidate for foreign political office.”85 The FCPA also contains one exception and two 
affirmative defenses to prosecution. The exception allows companies to participate in grease 
payments which allow the company to expedite routine governmental action.86 While the first 
defense makes a payment to an official legal if it falls under the statues of that foreign 
company. Legitimate and reasonable expenditure directly related to the promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services, or execution or performance of a 
contract is protected as an affirmative defense.87  
The FCPA contains two provisions: the anti-bribery provision and the accounting 
standard provision. The bribery provision consists of two stipulations that could be defined as a 
bribe. The first prohibits any payment made directly by any US company. The second 
specification prevents an organization from knowingly funneling a bribe through a third party 
agent. The accounting provision requires companies to maintain their books, records, accounts, 
and internal controls to a reasonable specification.  A company must accurately and honestly 
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reflect normal transactions and the value of assets.88 This second provision obscures creative 
accounting activity as well as makes it difficult for a corporation to hide corrupt payments and 
maintain slush funds. Substantially effective record keeping can prevent overpayments, missing 
receipts, records, unrecorded transactions, and misclassification of cost (i.e. phony consulting 
fees). Operational internal accounting controls verify that transactions are management 
authorized, recorded as necessary, and that only the proper authorities have access to 
company assets.89  
The United States Code 15 is composed of three sections.90 The first section specifically 
covers the securities issuer; the entity that must file with SEC. 78dd-2 includes any company 
agent or stockholder acting on behalf of the domestic concern. The final section pertains to 
non-US nationals who act within the territory of the United States.  The legislation expressly 
defines the terminology it employs to disrupt and possible grey area. 
A foreign official is any employee or officer of a foreign government, or any government 
owned unit, or a public international organization; including any person acting in an official 
capacity for a foreign government or public international organization. The definition of a public 
international organization is outlined in the U.S.C 22. A person is considered to have the 
knowledge of the act if they have a firm belief (there exist a high probability) or is aware of the 
misconduct. A routine governmental action is procuring licenses, permits or other foreign 
government documents to conduct business. A government agent fulfilling ordinary duties in 
his capacity: such as processing government papers, performing police services, mail delivery 
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and pick-up, contract inspections, providing utility service, and other actions of a similar 
disposition. Use of interstate instruments to conduct commerce, transportation or 
communication between states or any foreign country or any place outside of the previous 
locations qualifies as interstate commerce.91  
The SEC and the Department of Justice share responsibility in enforcing criminal and civil 
violations of the FCPA.  It is the responsibility of the Department of Justice to enforce the FCPA 
against those who haven’t registered with the SEC while the SEC handles companies that have 
registered securities. 
Penalties under the FCPA include a fine not to exceed five million dollars for a US natural 
or a detention sentence no longer than twenty years for a willful violation, or making a 
false/misleading statement. The fine for a non-US citizen increases to twenty five million 
dollars. For failure to file the necessary documents by their due date the fine is one hundred 
dollars per missing day. Failure to comply with the FCPA can result in a two million dollar for 
any issuer, officer or agent of the corporation, or stockholder as well as a prison term up to five 
years for liable individuals. The SEC can also bring civil action against culpable agents resulting 
in fines up to ten thousand dollars. 78 ff also prohibits the issuer from “directly or indirectly” 
pay the fines of any officer, agent, or stockholder.92  
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 In 1998 President Clinton signed a major amendment to the FCPA at the conclusion the 
OECD Convention on December 17, 1997.93 The major expansions consist of a clause that 
prohibits payments to secure any type of improper advantage. This clause is a step beyond the 
original language that only prohibited companies from influencing acts or inducing a violation 
of lawful duties to maintain or retain business.94 The amendment, additionally, expanded the 
application of the FCPA past the use of mail and interstate commerce to any means that result 
in an improper payment even outside the United States. The FCPA currently extends to any 
foreign nationals or businesses that perform any activity to violate the act while inside the 
borders of the United States Simpson.95 The penalty provisions of the FCPA now apply to any 
foreigner employed by a US company or any foreign agents acting on behalf of the American 
company. Finally, the 1998 amendment added officials of public international organizations (i.e. 
Red Cross, United Nations) as foreign officials whom could be influenced.96 
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Triton Energy Ltd was founded in 1962 by E.R. Wiley. The early Sixties saw abundant 
growth in the petroleum industry as many small, independent exploration companies were 
being created. During the next two decades many of these operational businesses were forced 
to shut down operations because of the volatility of the oil and gas industry. Triton was 
primarily a wildcatter oil company, meaning that the company specially sought petroleum in 
areas unknown to contain oil.97 These were very risky ventures because there is always a high 
probability that these types of companies would not strike oil. Because of the larger oil and gas 
companies who already had a majority control on the more lucrative, domestic oil fields, many 
small companies such as Triton were forced to venture elsewhere, generally abroad, to obtain 
petroleum. The saturated oil market in the Eighties caused huge dips in oil prices leaving many 
of the thirty thousand petroleum companies that had existed twenty years earlier defunct.98  
Bill Lee, who had joined the firm in 1960, was promoted to chief executive officer in 
1966. Lee commenced exploration abroad in many countries and found several large successful 
areas.  Lee discovered a large petroleum pocket in Thailand in the early Seventies. Triton was 
unable to begin operations in Thailand for a decade because of local government interference. 
Lee quickly learned that having a good rapport with foreign officials would be crucial if Triton 
would realize any prosperity in these countries.99  
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In 1989, Triton Energy sent a new internal audit director to complete an assessment of 
Triton Indonesia’s operations. The report compiled by the director contained damaging factual 
information. The report stated that in order to merely maintain operations the company paid 
illegal contributions to government and custom officials, inspectors, and auditors just to name a 
few. Senior managers were appalled by the director’s findings and ordered all copies of the 
memorandum to be destroyed.100 The accountant resigned from his post and promptly filed a 
report with the US Embassy in Indonesia after concern for his professional career came into 
question. Peat Marwick, Trion’s external auditors, voiced concern over internal controls after 
the former Triton accountant’s report was published. It is the responsibility of the audit firm to 
verify that the reported financial statements are adequate and conform to GAAP. The FCPA 
requires firms to disclose any bribery, kickbacks, or other illegal payments made to government 
officials. Triton was able to convince its auditors that all copies of the memo had been 
destroyed and formally responded to Peat Marwick’s inquest into the internal controls by 
neglecting important facts of the report. However, one copy of the report survived and was 
crucial substantive evidence in a 1991 lawsuit.101  
A former Triton controller sued the company on wrongful termination charges after he 
refused to sign off on 10-K filings because he voiced concern over the documentations lack of 
inclusion of illegal payments made to numerous foreign officials. He accused Triton of paying 
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off officials from every facet of business for Triton Indonesia.   The jury ruled in the 
accountant’s favor and opened the flood gates into Triton’s questionable practices abroad.102  
An SEC investigation into the conduct of Triton Indonesia revealed that the company 
had employed a longtime resident of Indonesia, Roland Siouffi, as a consultant (in reality, a go-
between with Indonesian officials). Two Indonesian audit teams were responsible for auditing 
Triton’s financials to determine the company’s taxable amounts that must be contributed to 
the government in order for Triton to fulfill contractual obligations with the state-owned 
Pertamina. The audit teams’ initial assessment required Triton to pay a total of $618,000 to the 
Indonesian government. Triton accounted for the payments in the records as legitimate 
business expenses. Siouffi would bill Triton for seismic data or oil exploration equipment 
repair.103 After meetings with Siouffi, the audit teams reported that all tax obligations had been 
settled. The SEC revealed that Triton had made similar payments totaling $450,000 for the 
years 1989 and 1990.104  
The SEC brought legal suit against Triton and two senior managers, Philip W. Keever and 
Richard L. McAdoo in February of 1997. None of the three defendants admitted or denied the 
allegations brought against them in court. Both senior managers signed cease and desist orders 
from committing or causing any violation of the FCPA.  The final judgment in the case fined 
Triton $300,000 and both senior managers a total $85,000. Because the violations also occurred 
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under former management, the court acknowledged that new and appropriate policies have 
been put in place.105  
 The Triton energy case was meant to serve as an example to other US companies of the 
consequences that await those who continue to illicit illegal payments. However, many 
transnational US based companies continue to enter emerging markets and use cash payments 
to approach the difficulty of grasping part of the market as evidence by the next two FCPA 
violations.  
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Lucent Technologies, Inc. was a former division of AT&T Technologies that was spun off 
from the parent corporation on September 30, 1996. A decade later, the French based Alcatel 
SA purchased the new entity to form the merger Alcatel-Lucent.106 The global 
telecommunications corporation has securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and thus 
falls under the subject to the authority of the Securities Exchange Commission.107 During the 
late nineties, Lucent China was awarded a high-speed optical transmission system contract as 
well signed as a Memorandum of Cooperation in the Telecommunication Industry with the 
Chinese government agency—Ministry of Post and Telecommunication. Bell Labs, a Beijing 
research center, was created by Lucent in 2000. The Chinese subsidiary accounted for 11% of 
Lucent’s consolidated revenues by securing millions of dollars in contracts with the Chinese 
government.108 The economic downturn has had taken a toll on the telecommunications sector, 
and Lucent has not been spared. 
 On December 21, 2007, the SEC brought suit against Lucent for improperly recording 
travel and entertainment for Chinese government officials which violated the FCPA. The 
telecommunications firm allegedly spent over $10 million from 2000 to 2003 on 315 trips to the 
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various locations, mostly the United States.109 Inter-company emails serve as the major 
evidence against the telecommunications giant. 
 Lucent normally prepared “Customer Visit Request Forms” to collect information on the 
trip and its potential participants. The form included the specific division and title of the 
officials as well as asked whether the visitors were “decision makers” or “influencers,” most 
qualified as “influencers.” The form was then sent to the China Operations Support team in 
Lucent’s US headquarters in New Jersey and the logistics of the trip was planned. The itineraries 
were then remitted back to Lucent China executives for approval.110 At no point in time did 
Lucent China or Lucent US consider if the travel arrangements violated the anti-bribery 
provision of the FCPA. 
 Lucent categorized the trips into two types depending on the purpose of the visit. The 
trip was labeled “pre-sale” if the officials were potential business associated and did not 
currently posses a contract with Lucent. The trip was classified as “post-sale”  if the officials 
currently held contracts with Lucent and were typically justified as factory visits or training 
seminars.  Fifty-five of these trips were classified as “pre-sale” while the remaining 260 were 
identified as “post-sale.”111  
 An example of a “pre-sale” trip occurred during two weeks in the month of April 2001. 
The trip included six officers of various levels that spent five of the days visiting the Lucent 
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facilities in Colorado, Illinois, and New Jersey.  The remainder of the visit (almost twice the 
business related days) was spent in other US cities such as Las Vegas and Boston and visiting 
locations such as Hawaii and the Grand Canyon. Lucent employees inappropriately recorded 
the $73,000 in the “Services Rendered- Other Services” or “International Travel” accounts. 
Neither account is supposed to be used for this type of expense because they both typically 
deal with product and service expenses. An internal email revealed that the trip could 
ultimately result in $500 million in revenues for Lucent112  
 Lucent used two techniques two facilitate a “post-sale” excursion to the States. The first 
is a “factory inspection” trip that was included as a requirement in provisions for many of 
Lucent’s contracts.113 Many of these visits became principally sight-seeing expeditions because 
after 2001 Lucent had outsourced many of its manufacturing facilities. The basic make up for 
these two weeks generally only included a single day for business related events. On one 
occasion, Lucent hosted nineteen Chinese officials expending $130,000 to go on a sight-seeing 
tour throughout the US. Lucent estimated that a contractual opportunity existed totaling four 
million dollars.114 “Training visits” were also a favorite of Lucent China employees. The trip 
would usually include one or two days conducting business related activities while the 
remainder of the States-side visit was a leisurely voyage to major US tourist destinations.115 Like 
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the “pre-sale” trips, Lucent employees were prone to booking these expenses to the “Service 
Rendered – Other Services” account.116  
 On December 21, 2007 Lucent entered into an agreement with the Department of 
Justice to pay a $1 million settlement.117 The settlement expresses that Lucent violated several 
of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions.  In addition, Lucent “without admitting or denying the 
allegations,” settled the outstanding civil suit with the SEC for $1.5 million.118 Both non-
prosecution agreements outline the typical result of many FCPA violation cases.  
 The fines were mean to reprimand the firm for violating the FCPA, but, like many 
companies, Alcatel-Lucent views these fines as anther cost of business. Between 2001 and 
2006, Alcatel allegedly paid out eight million dollars directly or indirectly to foreign officials.119 
The firm sustained the same internal controls that caused an investigation into pre-merger 
Lucent’s business activity.   The lawsuit stretches across multiple countries. The firm paid 
millions of dollars in bribes to either obtain or retain $303 million in contractual obligations in 
Costa Rica, $48 million in contractual obligations in Honduras, $27 million in contractual 
obligations in Taiwan, and $85 million in Malaysia.120 The bribery schemes in these countries 
consisted of a consultant that served as a middleman in the transactions. In all of these cases, 
high-level management executives knew or should have known what was transpiring in these 
large cash outlays.  
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 Alcatel-Lucent owns subsidiaries in all of these countries that are responsible for day-to-
day activities in their respective countries.  Alcatel Standard A.G. is an auxiliary that is 
responsible for employing business consultants for the majority of Alcatel-Lucent country 
subsidiary.121 The senior Alcatel executive composes a description of the responsibilities 
needed for their region and Alcatel Standard would solicit for an appropriate local consultant.  
The SEC recognized that Alcatel had an active 235 consultants in over 70 countries and weak 
internal controls to manage overpayments to business consultants.122 In some cases, Alcatel 
employees falsified documents or submitted incomplete and vague reports to controllers.123
 In December of 2009, Alcatel reached agreements with both Department of Justice and 
Securities Exchange Commission.  The firm would neither “admit nor deny violations of the 
anti-bribery, internal control and books and records provisions of the FCPA.”124 The settlement 
does require that the firm refrain from future violations of the FCPA as well as requiring three 
of Alcatel subsidiaries (Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel- Lucent Trade international AG and Alcatel 
Centroamerica) plead guilty to violating both provisions of the FCPA. The financial 
consequences that will impact Alcatel include a $45.4 million to the French government and a 
$92 million to DOJ and SEC. Both fines are payable in equal installments over four years.125  
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KBR and Halliburton 
 
The multinational corporation, Dresser Industries, acquired M.W. Kellogg in 1998. 
Halliburton, Dresser’s main rival, then merged with the company a decade later to become 
known as the Halliburton Company. M.W. Kellogg was then merged with Halliburton’s Brown & 
Root, Inc to become KBR, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Halliburton Company.126 KBR 
specializes in construction, engineering and military contracts. It participates in a contract 
market that becomes more and more competitive every year. By April of 2007, Halliburton and 
KBR agreed to sever ties and liquidate its equity in its subsidiary.127  
 On February 6, 2009 the US Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange 
Commission filed suit against Halliburton and KBR on grounds of violating the FCPA. The 
construction giant allegedly funneled tens of millions of dollars in bribes to third parties 
between 1995 and 2004 that would later be used to influence Nigerian officials to win 
construction contracts totaling approximately six billion dollars.128 The Halliburton Company 
also failed to devise adequate internal controls to detect fraudulent information in its books. 
 Nigeria created Nigeria liquefied natural gas (LNG) to develop its crude oil production. 
At all times the Nigerian government owned 49% of Nigeria LNG which would capture and sell 
the natural gas.129 The Nigerian government solicited bids in 1991 to build a LNG train, a facility 
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that would convert the crude oil into useable material.  In the same year, KBR, Technip of 
France, Italy’s Snamprogetti and Japan Gasoline Corporation formed an equal partnership 
(TSKJ) to pursue the Nigerian contract.130 The four companies formed a “cultural committee” 
whose main focus was attaining the Nigerian contract valued at $2.2 billion. Top level 
executives of all four companies composed the committee including KBR CEO Albert “Jack” 
Stanley.131 The committee ultimately believed that the only way to guarantee they would 
acquire the contract was to create a bribery scheme to sweeten the deal TSKJ held several 
meetings with Nigerian officials on various occasions to determine what amounts should be 
paid out. 132 
The scheme would involve two foreign agents that would act as a third party to funnel 
money to all levels of Nigerian officials. TSKJ then hired Jeffrey Tesler, a London based lawyer 
who had strong ties with senior Nigerian officials, and a Japanese global trading company as 
consultants. The falsified service contracts officially stated that the two agents would act as 
“cultural advisors.”133 The UK consultant would be primarily responsible for paying high-ranking 
officials while the Japanese consultant would pay lower-level officials.134 Over the almost ten-
year span, TSKJ paid Tesler $132 million and the Japanese agent $50 million to redistribute to 
Nigerian officials.135  
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In December of 1995, the Nigerian government awarded KBR the contract to build two 
LNG Trains for $2.2 billion. Just nine months earlier, TSKJ paid Tesler $60 million to begin 
distributing bribes to Nigerian officials.136  
The joint venture pursued a third LNG train contract in 1999 when Stanley and several 
other committee members met with Nigerian officials to settle on the $32.5 million that would 
again be paid to Tesler and distributed to accounts owned by Nigerian officials. The contract 
was awarded to TSKJ in the same month the private meeting took place.137  
Another meeting occurred between “cultural committee” members and Nigerian 
government officials in late 2001 to discuss the possibility of two more LNG train contracts. The 
two parties agreed on the sum of $51 million for contracts four and five which were valued at 
$1.6 billion.138 Tesler began using a subcontractor on the LNG contracts to make donations to 
Nigerian political parties or even hand deliver millions of dollars in US and Nigerian currency.139  
Documentation shows that TSKJ and the Japanese trading company entered into three 
separate contracts between 1996 and 2004 totaling $50 million. The consultant was then 
expected to distribute the funds to lower-ranking Nigerian government officials to help 
facilitate awarding TSKJ the LNG contracts.140  
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Halliburton and KBR are also charged with violating the accounting provision of the 
FCPA. The firms failed to perform the necessary due diligence according to its policy on its 
consultants. The Halliburton executives relied on statements of Stanley to continue the 
employment of the UK and Japanese firms. Their former policies did not require that the duties 
of the consultants be explicitly outlined.141 If the firm had performed the required due 
diligence, falsified documents would have been uncovered in relation to the references. The 
company refused to face the issues at hand and happily took the easy road to conducting their 
international business. 
On February 11, 2009, The Department of Justice and Securities Exchange Commission 
announced the Halliburton and KBR agreed to settlements with both government agencies. The 
two firms pleaded guilty to multiple counts of breaching FCPA. The settlement includes $570 
million in fines, permanently dictating that neither firm violate the FCPA in the future, and 
requires an independent overseer to review its FCPA compliance programs and internal 
controls.142 Technip and Snamprogetti were also fined $338 million and $365 million, 
respectively. The Japanese Gasoline Corporation is expected to receive a fine in the amount of 
$220 million.143 The present total fine currently sits at $1.29 billion which represents the second 
largest FCPA settlement. 
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Implications for American Business  
 
A forty year snapshot (or span) of the United States percentage of total world 
exports reveals a rather sporadic trend. Until 2000, total US exports has maintained a 
consistent market share fewer than twelve percent as shown in Table One.  The 2000s 
saw many recessionary movements, beginning with the burst of the Dot-com bubble at 
the beginning of the decade and ending with the most recent subprime mortgage crisis 
in that began in 2007 and evolved into a global recession. Numerous factors may have 
contributed to the decline of the US exports as a percentage of the total world market; 
these factors can be directly linked to the 1977 passage of the FCPA. Utilizing 
regressions in our analysis will be crucial in approaching a conclusion. 
 Hines developed four index indicators that mark the effects of the FCPA on 
American companies in foreign markets related to the measure of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), capital/labor ratios, joint venture activity, and aircraft exports.  
Because a numerous collection of economic activities can contribute to the 
manipulations of an economy, Hines’ study includes several variables to control for 
external factors.  An initial conclusion from the study observed that US firms 
experienced a business decline of thirty percent in local GDP terms.144  
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The first indicator is a measure of foreign direct investment. The FDI is defined as 
the net inflows of investment (which includes equity capital, long-term and short-term 
capital) in a firm by foreign investors. The FDI is a measure of ownership by foreign 
shareholders.145 Hines’ index identified the effect of the FCPA through: 
,  	
 	 
∆ 	 
, 	  
The terms are defined as following. The growth rate in the US in the sample period ex-
ante and ex-post 1997 is represented by the term,.  is measured by the 
necessity of participating in paying bribes to conduct profitable business in country i. 
∆ is the percentage change of GDP in country i during the sample period.
146 , is 
the measure of the growth rate of FDI into country i from all countries.  is a normally 
distributed residual from zero with limited variance. 
 and 
 are considered unknown 
parameters while estimating 
is the goal. Hines assumes that since the index is a ratio 
of US FDI before and after the passage of the FCPA that a factor like locality will not 
affect the index.147  
 Hines employed the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Business International 
corruption level index. Business International measures the extent to which corruption 
is implicated into business transactions, and they sell their measurements to 
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investors.148 The BI scale covers fifty-six risk factors for an individual country and then 
the country is assigned an integer from zero to ten. Ten being completely absent of 
corruption and zero being practically every transaction has some level of bribery. BI uses 
a mixture of internal country reports from locals and analytical research which is then 
reviewed by regional and central supervisors. GDP and FDI statistics were provided by 
the World Bank and the US Department of Commerce.149 Corrupt countries were 
defined as those countries assigned a BI rating of 0-7, while less corrupt countries were 
those assigned a BI rating 8-10. Ten of the thirty-five countries were considered corrupt. 
The countries were then divided as high GDP growth and low GDP growth. High GDP 
growth countries had a real GDP growth over a five year span (1977-1982) over the 
sample median.150  
 From 1977-1982, FDI in corrupt high-growth countries had a median of 1.38, 
while the median for less corrupt high-growth countries was .80. FDI specifically from US 
firms in corrupt high-growth countries the median was .80, while the median for less 
corrupt high-growth countries was .99. US firms display a contrary trend compared all 
other countries.151 Results from the FDI index indicate that the FCPA dissuaded US firms 
from conducting business in countries that were considered more corrupt. This could 
mean that many US companies viewed the business in corrupt countries as too risky and 
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the cost imposed by the FCPA as too high of a cost without a comparably adequate 
benefit. 
 Firms were constantly searching for ways to subvert anti-bribery legislation 
through other means. A common practice was substitute financial contributions for 
hiring additional labor. The deduction would be that American companies would reduce 
their capital-to-labor ratio.  The US Department of Commerce reports statistics on firms’ 
annual labor payments.152 Because of the differences in currency, industry focuses, and 
other external factors, Hines performed several regressions to control for these 
factors.153  
 The first test performed was consistent with the conclusion that capital-to-labor 
ratios would decreased. In the corrupt countries with high-growth GDP, the median fell 
(-3.12%) during the sample period. In less corrupt high-growth GDP countries, the 
median capital-to-labor ratio rose (5.32%).154 The second regression controlled for 
external national differences. The results of this second test show that the capital-to-
labor ratio in more corrupt countries fell 87% compared to that of less corrupt 
countries. These numbers are consistent with the conclusion of the negative impact of 
the FCPA. The last regression using this dependent variable seeks to invalidate any 
effects of prior declining capital-to-labor trends during the sample period, from 1996-
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1997.155 However, this regression did not   yield any statistically significant data but is 
consistent with that of the second regression. Hines was able to refute declining capital-
to-labor trends from having any effect.156  
 The Government Accountability Office reported that many American firms 
decided to abandon some foreign joint ventures because of the liability they would be 
exposed to in countries where it was culturally acceptable to engage in bribery. The 
third indicator sought to prove whether the FCPA was a cause to American firms’ 
avoidance of joint ventures in corrupt countries. The measurement metric used in this 
indicator is the US Department of Commerce report of percentage owned property, 
plant, & equipment in US majority owned companies and US partners.157  
 The median PPE growth in corrupt, high GDP countries for majority-owned 
partners surpassed the median of PPE growth in all affiliates by .29. A conflicting 
relationship can be found in less corrupt countries. In majority-owned partners the 
growth rate was .82 while for all affiliates the growth rate was 1.00. The level of 
investment by US minority owned companies decreased in corrupt countries and 
increased in those countries viewed as less corrupt.158 
 The final indicator used to assess the impact of the FCPA is the measure of 
Aircraft Exports. The US government has labeled the construction and aircraft industries 
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as the two industries most likely to be affected by the FCPA.159 It’s in these two 
industries that contracts tend to be very lucrative and competition for these countries 
very competitive.  This test can control for external factors specific to particular 
countries. Statistics for this test were gathered from reported numbers from the United 
Nations.160  
 The initial test showed that US aircraft exports fell as a percentage of the world 
market after the passage of the FCPA. The decline in more corrupt countries was far 
more pronounced in less corrupt countries at 21.18% and 6.37%, respectively. Hines 
next controlled for the total decline of all US exports in his second regression. The data 
from this test showed that US exports actually slightly rose during this time period. 
Imports from the US to corrupt countries rose .72% while slightly less in less corrupt 
countries at .68%. Hines performed a third regression to test if the aircraft industry had 
been experiencing a general decline in exports and the test concluded no significant 
data. 161 
 The four indicators included in Hines study all concluded that the FCPA had a 
negative effect of American firms’ performance in foreign markets directly after its 
passage. The study explicitly showed that American firms consciously decreased their 
business activity in those countries labeled as “more corrupt.” It was unclear if those 
companies that chose to continue business operations in corrupt countries repeatedly 
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engaged in illegal business practices.162 Hines concluded by articulating the effect an 
international legislation could have by decisively curtailing bribery in international 
business.163 
 Additionally, a 2007 study concluded that the FCPA and OECD convention has 
had a positive affect on decreasing the amount and frequency of international bribery. 
Cuervo-Cazurra argued that the multilateral movement to outlaw bribery in business was the 
only solution to create a free and competitive business arena. Anti-bribery legislation 
not only increases the cost of participating in illegal payments, but also reduces the 
supply side of corruption.164  Continued international collaboration is a necessary step in 
order to element bribery as acceptable business expenditure.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper I set out to answer the question: What affect has the FCPA had on 
American businesses performance abroad. My initial hypothesis was that the FCPA created an 
uneven playing field for American businesses and that foreign competitors would persistently 
seek to take advantage of this fact. There is evidence that American companies have 
consistently lost business because of the FCPA, but I discovered that at the root of the issue was 
corruption.  Corruption occurs when officials are willing to sell their services and private 
individuals or companies are willing to buy an unfair advantage. The public is weary of the 
scandals that plaque American business and demands the continued transparency and access 
into these companies. The international movement to prevent these types of transactions seeks 
to choke the supply side of bribery.  
The countries that have adopted signed the OECD convention or similar anti-bribery 
legislation has showed that they will hold their companies to a higher standard of business 
practices and corporate governance. The success of the FCPA requires mutual administration 
throughout the world and a stronger defined approach for companies to adhere to. It will take 
a resolute effort from every level of private and public officials to have a permanent impact that 
on business and to promote business practice. 
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